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Social mechanisms are theoretical cogs and wheels that explain how and why one thing
leads to another. Mechanisms can run from macro to micro (e.g., explaining the effects of
organizational socialization practices or compensation systems on individual actions),
micro to micro (e.g., social comparison processes), or micro to macro (e.g., how
cognitively limited persons can be aggregated into a smart bureaucracy). Explanations in
organization theory are typically rife with mechanisms, but they are often implicit. In this
article, the authors focus on social mechanisms and explore challenges in pursuing a
mechanisms approach. They argue that organization theories will be enriched if scholars
expend more effort to understand and clarify the social mechanisms at play in their work
and move beyond thinking about individual variables and the links between them to
considering the bigger picture of action in its entirety.
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Creating a new theory is not like destroying an old
barn and erecting a skyscraper in its place. It is rather
like climbing a mountain, gaining new and wider
views, discovering unexpected connections between
our starting point and its rich environment.
—Albert Einstein (Einstein & Infeld, 1938)
The process of theory building is tricky. Many theo-
rists claim that the best way to learn about theory
building is to do it (see Lave & March, 1975). In the
spring of 2004, we set out to understand better theory
construction by taking part in a doctoral seminar enti-
tled “Mechanisms of Organized Action.”1 Using the
work of Hedström and Swedberg (1998) as a concep-
tual starting point, our primary goal was to better
appreciate how a mechanisms-based approach can
inform our understanding of management and orga-
nization theories and theory construction.2 This essay
reflects some of what we learned.
Social mechanisms are “bits of theory about entities
at a different level (e.g., individuals) than the main
entities being theorized about (e.g., groups), which
serve to make the higher level theory more supple,
more accurate, or more general” (Stinchcombe, 1991,
p. 367). They are the theoretical “cogs and wheels”
that explain why two variables covary (Hernes, 1998,
p. 74). Social mechanisms are the explanations of how
the components of a theory interrelate (Elster, 1989), a
necessary—but in many cases absent—aspect of orga-
nizational theories (Sutton & Staw, 1995; Weick, 1989).
In this seminar, we asked each other and our guest
participants, “What happens when we make explicit
the mechanisms that are implicit in organizational
research?”
Our approach was to broaden our inquiry from the
formally enrolled student members of our seminar
(first seven authors) and the faculty instructor
(Kathleen Sutcliffe) to include 10 of our colleagues:
Wayne Baker, Stuart Bunderson, Jerry Davis, Jane
Dutton, Mary Ann Glynn, Bob Quinn, Jeffrey
Sanchez-Burks, Gretchen Spreitzer, Klaus Weber, and
Karl Weick. We invited them to present their research
at the Ross School of Business at the University of
Michigan and to make explicit the mechanisms that
underlay their theoretical arguments. In the following
sections, we describe what we discovered, what
intrigued us, what confused us, what surprised us,
what blindsided us, what was missing, what was left
ambiguous, and what we wanted to know more
about. We highlight some of our challenges and pro-
pose some questions for researchers who might want
to adopt a mechanisms-based approach to research.
We argue that all scholars can benefit from thinking in
terms of social mechanisms. Organizational explana-
tions are typically rife with mechanisms, but they are
often implicit. We encourage organizational scholars
to make these mechanisms explicit.
MECHANISMS AND
THEORY BUILDING
We view a social mechanism as a process that
explains an observed relationship; mechanisms
explain how and/or why one thing leads to another:
“If a regression tells us about a relation between two
variables—for instance, if you wind a watch, it will
keep running—mechanisms pry the back off the
watch and show how” (Davis & Marquis, in press). A
focus on mechanisms enables one to move beyond
thinking about individual variables and the specific
links between them to considering the bigger picture
of action in its entirety. For example, to understand
how a watch functions, the important items are not the
moving hands or the winding knob but rather the
internal cogs and wheels and how they enable the
translation from winding a knob into the movement of
the watch hands. According to Hernes (1998), mecha-
nisms are about “the wheelwork or agency by which
an effect is produced. In this way, mechanisms do not
merely address what happened but also how it
happened” (p. 74).
To that end, mechanisms allow us to see beyond the
surface-level description of a phenomenon. If we
observe two variables, X and Y and some association
between them, we know little more than that X and Y
are correlated. Does X cause Y? Does Y cause X? Or are
we observing a spurious correlation between the two
brought about by a third unobserved variable, Z?
Answering this question requires one to move beyond
studying the X-Y relationship to addressing the ques-
tion of why and how the relationship occurs. In other
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words, what is the process underlying the relation-
ship? As Weick (1974) put it, mechanisms are about
verbs and causal links rather than nouns and variables
(see also Sandelands & Drazin, 1989).
There is a limit, however, to the generality of mech-
anisms. Mechanisms are not like the deterministic
laws of physics in which certain inputs lead to certain
outputs with no ifs, ands, or buts (Elster, 1998;
Hedström & Swedberg, 1998). Instead, mechanisms
allow us to address the probabilistic nature of social
life, an idea that Coleman (1964) captures nicely with
his description of models of social processes as
“sometimes-true theory” (p. 516). There are boundary
conditions to all social theory, and a mechanisms-
based approach helps make these boundaries explicit.
As Stuart Bunderson from Washington University
remarked during his presentation to us on March 17,
2004, “Clarity about mechanisms allows researchers
to consider possible boundary conditions of a rela-
tionship and to conduct subsequent empirical tests to
evaluate an argument’s validity.”
The focus on mechanisms as explanations provides
a clear connection to advice on theorizing that organi-
zational scholars have offered the field in special
issues of the Academy of Management Review (October
1989) and Administrative Science Quarterly (September
1995). An integral goal of theory construction, as
described by Weick (1989), is to design a process that
highlights relationships, connections, and interdepen-
dencies in the phenomenon of interest. Inherent in this
explanation is the idea that a theory should make
explicit the linkages that connect the input and the
output, thereby illuminating the process by which the
input is transformed into the output. Sutton and Staw
(1995) further expound on this point. They suggest
that predicting a relationship is not sufficient for
building theory unless that predicted relationship is
thoroughly explained. They note, “The key issue is
why a particular set of variables are expected to be
strong predictors . . . . The logic underlying the por-
trayed relationships needs to be spelled out” (p. 376).
In their view, strong theory must delve into the under-
lying processes to understand the systematic reasons
for a particular occurrence or nonoccurrence. The
essence of all of these comments is appropriately sum-
marized in Sutton and Staw’s assertion that organiza-
tional research cannot present theoretical contribu-
tions without clearly offering an explanation of the
connections among phenomena, a story about why
acts, events, structures, and thoughts occur. These
ideas are consistent with the etymology of the word
explain, which comes from the Latin explanare, which
means “to take out the folds, to make something level
or even” (Kaplan, 1964, p. 330; Webster’s, 1979). When
we speak colloquially of explanations, we ask some-
one to tell us how the story unfolds.
Focusing on social mechanisms is one way to heed
this theory-building advice and delve deeper into the
explanations of social phenomenon. Our seminar pre-
senters described how focusing on a mechanisms-
based approach enabled them to achieve a deeper
level of theorizing. Gretchen Spreitzer, in describing
her work with Bob Quinn on March 31, 2004, said,
“Thinking about mechanisms helped us to make the
implicit more explicit in our work. It helped us
uncover important patterns that we had not seen
before.” Similarly, Mary Ann Glynn (March 29, 2004)
explained, “One of the utilities of a mechanism-based
approach to organization theory is that it enables you
to articulate the causal linkages.”
To see how uncovering mechanisms leads to better
and deeper theorizing, suppose we have strong rea-
sons to believe that X causes Y. Figure 1 visually repre-
sents this relationship. Yet a larger question looms:
Why does X cause Y? The answer may more closely
resemble the model in Figure 2, pictured here as it
unfolds. This second model still shows that X leads to
Y but suggests that the transition from X to Y is not as
smooth and straightforward as initially believed.
Instead, there are extra kinks in the initial, unex-
plained effect, suggesting some of the inner workings,
mechanisms to relating X and Y. The end result is a
model that still represents a causal relationship
between X and Y, but unlike the first (Figure 1), it is
explicit in the mechanisms of how X causes Y. An
explicit focus on understanding the relationships
involved between X and Y often results in a deeper
level of theorizing than just focusing on each of those
variables or simply their association.
MECHANISMS IN
ORGANIZATION STUDIES
Jerry Davis (March 3, 2004) asserted that organiza-
tion studies are uniquely suited to mechanisms-based
theorizing and that organizational scholarship will
benefit from more such theorizing. As he noted, col-
lective action (e.g., a social movement, an organiza-
tional decision, or contagion of an idea in a popula-
tion) normally requires thinking through the link from
individual to collective processes. Mechanisms enable
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us to understand how the individual pieces ultimately
result in the collective outcome. For example, Davis
noted that March and Simon’s (1958) explanation of
hierarchy in terms of bounded rationality serves as a
masterful example of mechanisms-based theorizing.
They began with a question about how cognitively
limited individuals are able to accomplish ends
greater than their individual abilities and efforts
would suggest. They argued that this occurs through
the differentiation of subunits into bite-sized chunks
and the artful reaggregation of those chunks via hier-
archy. Thus, the transformation of atomistic action
into complex organization is explained through two
mechanisms: differentiation and aggregation. Identi-
fying these two processes gives researchers and man-
agers insight into the mechanisms through which
individuals accomplish collective action. Like the X
and Y example (see Figure 1), a theory based only on
the individual inputs or the organizational output
would be, to quote Stinchcombe (1991), “less supple,
less accurate and less general” (p. 367) than a theory
that considered the underlying mechanisms.
Karl Weick (December 10, 2003) provocatively
opened our class with a dictionary definition of mech-
anisms using machine imagery. He then proposed that
such an approach to understanding mechanisms in
organizational research might lead scholars to over-
look the importance of so-called disciplined imagina-
tion in their theorizing. To guide our exploration of
mechanisms in organizational studies, Weick recom-
mended a taxonomy developed by Hedström and
Swedberg (1998) that focuses on three different types
of social mechanisms (see Figure 3): situational,
action-formation, and tranformational. Those mecha-
nisms that explain the influence of macro forces on
more microlevel phenomena are situational mecha-
nisms. Those that operate solely at the micro level
linking cognition to behavior are action-formation
mechanisms. Finally, those that describe how
microlevel factors affect the macro level are
transformational mechanisms. We found this multi-
level, macro-to-micro, micro-to-micro, micro-to-
macro, bathtub-shaped model quite useful for explor-
ing the topic. Because we situated our analyses of
mechanisms in organizational studies, we see the
micro-macro distinction as relative. For example,
under our conception, a corporation could be a macro
force operating on individuals at the micro level; the
corporation could also be an actor at a micro level, and
the macro influence might therefore be an organiza-
tional field, country, or even geographic community.
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Figure 1: Simple depiction of X causing Y
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Figure 2: Unfolding the macrolevel effect into its microlevel
components
We illustrate the Hedström and Swedberg model with
examples from our presenters at both the organiza-
tional and individual levels of analysis.
Two of our presenters employed situational mecha-
nisms, describing macro influences on more micro
behaviors. Klaus Weber (March 24, 2004) explained
how national cultures influence the public self-
presentation strategies that biotech companies use in
Germany and the United States. He described ecologi-
cal fit as an important mechanism that determines the
cultural resources on which firms draw (i.e., how
firms in different locations face different problems
that lead them to utilize different cultural tools; Weber,
2003). Jeffrey Sanchez-Burks (April 14, 2004) demon-
strated the connection between national culture and
individual behavior in organizations. As a mecha-
nism, he described how relational schemas (i.e.,
expectations of what should happen in a specific situ-
ation) develop in different cultures and are then
reflected in how individuals approach social situa-
tions. For example, the protestant relational ideology,
a dominant relational schema in the United States,
leads individuals to eschew relational concerns at
work (Sanchez-Burks, 2002).
Other presenters provided examples of action-
formation mechanisms whereby the beliefs and
opportunities of a social actor generate individual
action. Wayne Baker (March 10, 2004) discussed mech-
anisms of network diffusion (Baker & Faulkner, 2003,
2004). One of the examples he raised, operating at the
organizational level, was the diffusion of corporate
governance practices among large U.S. companies
(Davis, 1991). Davis found that the social mechanism
influencing the adoption of governance practices was
social cohesion: The closer a focal actor’s connection to
a prior adopter, the greater the likelihood of adoption.
Presumably, this is a result of the focal firm’s uncer-
tainty and information sharing among connected
firms. Jane Dutton, Gretchen Spreitzer, and Bob Quinn
all discussed action-formation mechanisms at the
individual level. For example, Roberts, Dutton,
Spreitzer, Heaphy, and Quinn (in press) theorize
about the relationship between receiving positive
feedback about the self and identity change. They
write that the process of collecting self-relevant feed-
back from diverse others highlights capacities that
individuals are not aware that they possess. This
awareness of new capacities nourishes positive shifts
in identity and enables individuals to draw on these
capacities as they carry out their work.
Finally, some of our presenters also illustrated
transformational mechanisms whereby processes at
the micro level lead to change at the macro level. Mary
Ann Glynn explained how and why organizational
names have changed from colonial times to the pres-
ent (Glynn & Abzug, 2002). In examining these
changes, it was found that an important mechanism
was a legitimacy threshold: Name changes increase
dramatically after a tipping point has been reached in
the prevalence of types of names. For example, in the
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Figure 3: Adaptation of Hedström and Swedberg’s mechanism model
Source: Hedström and Swedberg (1998).
1980s, there were many changes to acronym-based
names as a result of corporate mergers and acquisi-
tions. After the number of these changes passed a cer-
tain threshold, Glynn argued that these names began
to define legitimacy, and even firms that had not
undergone mergers adopted acronym-based names.
Finally, speaking of the individual level, Bunderson
(2003) described how individuals’ functional back-
grounds influence the structure of social networks. He
found that one mechanism by which individual func-
tional background influences networks is that it
increases expert power that enables experienced indi-
viduals to cross boundaries, communicate with
others, and become more central in a group.
We found Hedström and Swedberg’s (1998) typol-
ogy of mechanisms—situational, action-formation,
and transformational—to be a tractable framework
for identifying and making explicit the mechanisms
inherent in a theory. The multilevel nature of the
model forced us to think more rigorously about how
certain theories might apply to multiple levels of anal-
ysis and about the potential boundary conditions of a
mechanisms approach. In our next section, we
describe the key themes that emerged as challenges to
a mechanisms-based approach to theorizing.
CHALLENGES OF A
MECHANISMS-BASED
THEORY OF ORGANIZING
We present three recurring themes from our discus-
sions and offer recommendations on how to use mech-
anisms productively in organizational research. First,
we address what we have come to call the stopping
rule, a set of guidelines for determining when to stop
looking for new mechanisms. Second, we discuss the
challenge of addressing the dynamics of mechanisms
and processes that occur over time. Finally, we explore
linkages between mechanisms-based work and
managerial practice.
The Stopping Rule
Mechanisms-based research calls for investigators
to push their theory beyond stating that X causes Y to
understanding the processes by which X causes Y.
However, as Kaplan (1964) writes, no matter what
explanation one has provided, there exist new rela-
tionships to be elucidated: “There is always some-
thing else to be explained . . . . Explanations, like con-
cepts and laws, have a certain openness; in particular,
every explanation is ‘intermediate,’ in the sense that it
contains elements which are to be explained in turn”
(pp. 340-341). Thus, mechanisms, although designed
to provide answers, tend to raise additional questions.
Each time they discover an answer to one research
question, scholars face many new questions. Why?
How? When? For whom? Under what conditions?
For example, in his discussion of network processes
of diffusion, Wayne Baker described how structural
equivalence (i.e., holding the same network position
as others) is one of the mechanisms of diffusion. We
speculated that it might be fruitful to push the expla-
nation further to understand the processes that under-
lie structural equivalence. We considered social com-
parison as a possible mechanism underlying the
structural equivalence mechanism: Individuals look
to others for information about how to act (Festinger,
1954). We could push this explanation still further,
delving into the cognitive processes that result in
social comparison, or perhaps even deeper into the
neurological processes that underlie these cognitive
processes. To understand network diffusion, where
and when does it make sense to stop explaining? Is it
network position, social psychological processes such
as social comparison, or cognitive processes?
Facing these questions, scholars concerned with
mechanisms may experience a tyranny of freedom
(Schwartz, 2000). There is no limit to the number of
available research questions and explanations, and
few guidelines exist for choosing which of these ques-
tions to ask and answer. How do scholars know when
to stop searching for explanations or mechanisms and
say, “That’s enough!”? To address where and when to
stop, we have distilled advice from our presenters and
the mechanisms literature into three recommendations.
Look to the boundaries of existing literature. Perhaps
the most straightforward stopping rule implores
scholars to ask, “What does the field already know?”
and then forge one step beyond it. Klaus Weber
described how existing literature should guide us to
understand where to stop and where to continue
searching for explanations. He drew on Kuhn’s (1996)
discussion of the incremental process of scientific dis-
covery and how many advances are based on elabo-
rating and refining previous work. For example, he
discussed how the concept of legitimacy was once
seen as a key mechanism of isomorphism in new insti-
tutional theory. However, as legitimacy became rela-
tively accepted, scholars began pushing to under-
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stand the conditions and boundaries of legitimacy,
and so the next logical question focused on unpacking
the mechanisms that underlie legitimacy. Weber sug-
gested that an examination of current boundaries pro-
vides direction about opportunities to ask the next
questions of why and how.
Investigate contiguous levels of analysis. According to
Hackman’s (2003) bracketing decision rule, scholars
should investigate one level above and one level
below their focal phenomena. If a researcher is inter-
ested in understanding individual behavior, the key
mechanisms may reside in group structures and pro-
cesses (one level above) and in individual cognitions
and emotions (one level below). This rule is construc-
tive in guiding scholars to invest time and energy in
the questions closest to their areas of expertise. For
example, Hackman describes the value of bracketing
in discovering important mechanisms in a study of
motivation in orchestra groups amidst changing gen-
der composition. A focal phenomenon of interest was
the motivation of orchestra groups, which declined
significantly as the prevalence of women in the tradi-
tionally male groups increased. In search of mecha-
nisms, the researchers looked upward to the orchestra
culture and downward to individual actors. At the
organizational level, the degree to which the orches-
tra’s cultural norms approved or disapproved of
women was an important influence on how members
reacted to the entrance of women. At the individual
level, men reacted considerably more negatively to
these gender composition changes than did women.
Thus, both individual-level and cultural factors
helped to explain why group motivation decreased as
women entered the orchestra groups.
Another example is Marquis’s (2003) study of the
social network structure of 51 U.S. communities,
which investigated why communities established ear-
lier are more likely to have cohesive networks. Previ-
ous explanations for this phenomenon focused on
local cultural factors relating to the upper class (Kono,
Palmer, Friedland, & Zafonte, 1998). Alternatively, by
exploring mechanisms at a lower level of analysis (in
this case, the individual organizations that compose
the community networks), Marquis found that the
pattern is maintained by new entrants to the system
imitating other local actors.
The bracketing rule also comes with limitations
along with the advantages. Questions of what consti-
tutes an appropriate level may remain ambiguous. If a
researcher believes that a culture has prescribed a par-
ticular set of norms, to which culture should the
researcher turn—group culture, department culture,
organizational culture, local community culture,
regional culture, or even national culture?
Know yourself. In making stopping decisions, schol-
ars must consider their own interests and skills. Our
assumptions about the world shape our interests
toward particular questions and types of explanations
(Bannister, 1966; Kelly, 1955; Little, 1972). We may find
ourselves most engaged and satisfied if we pursue
those questions that we find inherently fascinating
(Holland, 1996; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Regarding skills,
scholars may be particularly adept at answering cer-
tain questions, employing particular methods, and
explaining certain phenomena. Other questions,
methods, and phenomena may not fit scholars’
strengths. For example, the network diffusion studies
we examined focus on network factors such as cohe-
sion and structural equivalence rather than psycho-
logical processes that underlie these mechanisms. We
suspect that one reason for this focus is that these
mechanisms fit the interests and strengths of the
network researchers.
Another aspect of knowing oneself that may help
scholars determine when and where to stop consists of
clarifying the objectives of the research. Are scholars
hoping to develop descriptive, prescriptive, and/or
interpretive conclusions? Are they seeking to under-
stand a specific independent variable or a particular
dependent variable? Are they asking questions and
discovering answers directed at making a difference
in practice? In a given research project, a scholar may
be more concerned with some of these objectives than
others. Certain questions and explanations may be
well suited to achieving these objectives. As such,
identifying the objectives of their research projects
may facilitate scholars’ efforts to decide when and
where to stop.
Temporal Processes
Beyond the stopping rule, we encountered a second
challenge in applying the Hedström and Swedberg
(1998) framework in our research: Things become more
complicated when one considers that organizational
processes unfold and change over time. In considering
dynamic processes, the categorization of mechanisms
into situational, action-formation, and transformational
mechanisms forces the theorist to freeze the process in
question at a certain point in time and does not allow
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room for mechanisms at each stage to change. For
example, when Jane Dutton presented her research on
the organizing of compassion on April 7, 2004, she
presented a model comprising three stages: activa-
tion, mobilization, and acceleration (Dutton, Worline,
Frost, & Lilius, 2004). When her theory was applied to
the Hedström and Swedberg framework, however,
she commented that much of the dynamism in the
process of organizing was lost. Moreover, she
reflected that fitting the model into the framework
forced her to focus on the parts of the process at the
expense of the dynamic unfolding whole. Thus,
although advantageous at times for illuminating new
patterns and questions, Hedström and Swedberg’s
model may not be applicable to all mechanisms and
may ironically induce a kind of reductionism that
causes scholars to lose sight of the whole.
In considering frameworks that may better account
for dynamic processes that unfold over time, we
found Barley and Tolbert’s (1997) structuration frame-
work to be a constructive alternative to the Hedström
and Swedberg (1998) approach. The Barley and
Tolbert framework describes a generic model for the
relationship between institutions and actions, describ-
ing an ongoing process of how institutions constrain
action and how action in turn both maintains and
modifies the institutions that constrain it. Importantly,
this process unfolds over time. Figure 4 is a modified
version of Barley and Tolbert’s model that incorpo-
rates Hedström and Swedberg’s typology of mecha-
nisms. The vertical arrows denote situational mecha-
nisms that account for how macro forces such as
institutions influence micro action. The diagonal
arrows represent how micro action modifies or main-
tains the macro influences that constrain it. The pro-
cess unfolds over time, allowing for the mechanisms
to change over time and accounting for changes in
either the constraining context or the action-formation
mechanisms, both of which are represented on the
horizontal axes. Thus, the Barley and Tolbert frame-
work allows for numerous cycles of situational,
action-formation, and transformational mechanisms
that unfold over time and occur in the context of inter-
actions. Rather than focusing on a particular type of
social mechanism at a particular moment in time (a
snapshot approach to organizing), their framework
explains social phenomena as continuous processes
entailing successive interactions from the macro to the
micro and then back to the macro.
Linking to Practice
Thus far, much of this essay has focused on how a
mechanisms-based approach can makes the explana-
tions in a theory more explicit. A continual challenge
for management theorists, however, is to contribute to
management practice. Inspired by Spreitzer and
Quinn’s presentation, we were challenged to consider
the role of mechanisms in facilitating conversations
between theorists and practitioners. The issue of
bridging the gap between theory and practice is
becoming increasingly relevant; indeed the theme of
the 2004 Academy of Management meeting was “Cre-
ating Actionable Knowledge.” Scholars have written
for decades about understanding the relationship
between theory and practice, and we are mindful that
our field lacks consensus about the relationship. Some
scholars believe that theory ought to inform and be
informed by practice (e.g., Lewin, 1951; Rynes,
Bartunek, & Daft, 2001), whereas others believe that
theory serves an entirely different and incommensu-
rate function from that of practice (e.g., Sandelands,
1990).
As we continued to consider mechanisms, we real-
ized that a deeper understanding of mechanisms
might be one way to better translate organizational
theories into managerial action. Bridging the divide
between theorists and practitioners is no simple task.
Weick (2003) claims that the key criticisms that practi-
tioners make of theorists is that they “comment on
practice but elide context, overlook constraints, take
the wrong things for granted, overestimate control,
presume unattainable ideals, underestimate dyna-
mism, or translate comprehensible events into incom-
prehensible variables” (p. 453). Mechanisms, because
they are situated in context and have clear boundary
conditions, seem ideally suited to begin to address this
concern.
There are several areas in which our presenters
found mechanisms to be helpful for managers. For
example, according to Spreitzer and Quinn, both
experienced executive education instructors, students
desire to know under what conditions a strategy will
succeed and when it will not. By providing explicit
explanations and isolating those elements that can be
manipulated to change outcomes, mechanisms may
be one key to translating theory into action. More con-
cretely, mechanisms may allow people to see how they
can travel from X to Y and allow them to recognize
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what exactly they need to do to set the process in
motion. For example, the displeasure with total qual-
ity management following its initial success resulted
from the way that top management mandated its
implementation without offering clear explanations
to middle management about how it really worked
(Hackman & Wageman, 1995). In this instance, even if
the theory is not important to the implementation
itself, the detailed cogs and wheels that translate X
into Y may be essential for managers to understand
and believe in the efficacy of the programs.
CONCLUSION
We began this essay by accentuating the impor-
tance of mechanisms in the theory-building process.
We described the benefits of mechanisms in terms of
seeing new relationships and advancing our capabili-
ties to predict and understand the social world. We
discussed the challenges of applying mechanisms in
organizational research and presented approaches to
transforming these challenges into opportunities,
including how these can even help us connect better
with more practice-oriented audiences.
As noted, our initial goal was to understand how
studying mechanisms would help us build better the-
ory by focusing more explicitly on explanations. An
unexpected byproduct was that we learned even more
about the scholarship of our colleagues and bolstered
our broad research community. In addition, we real-
ized that studying the mechanisms that underlie one’s
existing work also opens new research opportunities.
Our presenters noted that a focus on mechanisms
helped them develop new insights and research ques-
tions. This point was perhaps best explained by Stuart
Bunderson:
A consideration of mechanisms might suggest the
next interesting question for my work. For example, in
studying the relationship between team functional
diversity and team process/performance [Bunderson
& Sutcliffe, 2002a, 2002b], we recognized that we (and
others in this domain of research) were making an
assumption about how member expertise was being
combined to affect a team’s decision. Specifically, we
were assuming that each member’s expertise was
equally weighted. While this was perhaps a service-
able assumption in that particular study, it is clearly a
questionable assumption since intra-group involve-
ment and influence may not be (and very likely is not)
purely democratic. This led to a follow-up study in
which I explicitly examined how member differences
in functional background can lead to different levels
of intra-group involvement and influence [see
Bunderson, 2003].
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Figure 4: Adaptation of Barley and Tolbert’s structuration model
Source: Barley and Tolbert (1997).
Thus, although our stopping rule raises cautions
about becoming mired in deeper and deeper ques-
tions, pushing the boundaries of one’s assumptions
and explanations can be generative, leading to
research paths previously not considered.
Another theme that arose from our discussions was
that focusing on mechanisms makes the socially con-
structed nature of research more explicit. Some of our
previous recommendations prescribed that scholars
should look for mechanisms that fit them and that
much remains left open to individuals’ definitions
when choosing levels of analysis. That we have
choices as scholars in deciding among mechanisms
that interest us may introduce an arbitrariness into
scholarship that makes research, at least partially, a
process of creation. For example, we can opt to eluci-
date one set of mechanisms while ignoring another
set. By focusing on one mechanism to the exclusion of
others, we create research streams that may only par-
tially explain a phenomenon. From our perspective,
one benefit of an explicit treatment of mechanisms is
to make more explicit our role in the creation of the
social world. Revealing the logic that guides our
choices in variable selection and hypothesis formula-
tion, which often is only implicit in scholarly work,
shows the reader which part of the social world we
chose to explain. We can make the story of creation
crisper and surface our role in that story: These are the
assumptions of my story and the conditions under
which my theory works, and this is what I overlooked
and why.
This essay, much like mechanisms themselves, may
have raised more questions than answers. We believe
that grappling with these questions will constitute a
fruitful journey for organizational scholars in the
theory-building process. Ralph Waldo Emerson
(1850) wrote, “Here is the world, sound as a nut, per-
fect, not the smallest piece of chaos left, never a stitch
nor an end, not a mark of haste, or botching, or second
thought; but the theory of the world is a thing of
shreds and patches.” We hope that our insights will
contribute to the sewing of new patches by
reinvigorating existing conversations and inspiring
new conversations among organizational researchers.
NOTES
1. The course syllabus is available at https://coursetools
.ummu.umich.edu/2004/winter/ob/899/001.nsf
2. After an introductory session on mechanism-based
theory, the seminar convened twice a week for 7 weeks. One
session per week involved a presentation by an invited
researcher or team, followed by a more extensive discussion
with the scholars of the assigned readings and topic, and
then a focused discussion of the mechanisms in the work.
Because we also wanted to extend our thinking about each
of the topics that we considered, we reconvened a second
time to elaborate our ideas. Between the two sessions, we
were charged with the task of developing our ideas on how
the mechanisms had been applied in the scholar’s work and
how this exercise added to our emerging knowledge on
mechanisms in the theories discussed and in general. We
hoped that a broader but also more refined picture of mecha-
nisms would emerge as the weeks progressed.
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